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L Facts
On February 5, 1997, Dawn McNees Snyder ("Snyder") disappeared
from the flower shop where she worked in Augusta County.' Her body,
badly mutilated by animals, was discovered on February 21, 1997, near a
riverbank two miles from the florist shop.2 Because of the state of Snyder's
body, dental records were used for establishing Snyder's identity. On.
February 22, 1997, Bobby Wayne Swisher ("Swisher") revealed to his friend
Henry Ridgeway, Jr. ("Ridgeway") that he had abducted, raped, sodornized,
and killed Snyder.4 Ridgeway went to the police the next day and relayed
the details of Swisher's confession to them.5
On February 5, Swisher entered the florist shop where Snyder worked,
approached her and said, "I have a gun in my pocket."6 Swisher revealed a
butcher knife to Snyder and forced her to leave the flower shop through the
rear door.7 In a field some distance away, near the South River, Swisher
stopped Snyder and directed her to perform oral sodomy on him, which she
did.' Next, Swisher forced Snyder to remove her clothes and raped her.'
Swisher then permitted Snyder to dress and then forced her to perform
another act of oral sodomy upon him.'" At this point, Swisher decided it
would be in his best interest to kill Snyder since she had seen his face and
might have been able to identify him to the authorities."
Swisher slit Snyder across the left side of her face and, again, across the
throat. 2 He then "gouged her" and threw her into the river; Swisher then
walked along the river, following Snyder's floating body, asking, "[a]re-are
1. Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763, 765 (Va. 1998).
2. Id. at 765.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 766.
6. Id at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id






you dead yet?"" When Swisher saw Snyder crawl up the riverbank, he "got
scared and took off running. "14
Pursuant to this tip from Ridgeway, several officers went to Swisher's
residence and invited him to the police station for questioning in connection
with the murder of Snyder."5 Swisher spoke with'the deputies but did not
confess until after his arrest. 6
Swisher was tried before a jury and found guilty of the capital murder
of Snyder in the commission of abduction with the intent to defile the
victim of such abduction or in the commission of or subsequent to rape or
forcible sodomy, the abduction with intent to defile Snyder, the rape of
Snyder, and forcible sodomy of Snyder."7
During the sentencing phase of the capital murder trial, the jury fixed
Swisher's punishment at death, finding that he represented a continuing
serious threat to society and that his offense was outrageous or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery to the victim. 8
Swisher alleged on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia that
the trial court erred in its failure to (1) direct the Commonwealth to file a
bill of particulars in response to Swisher's motion; 9 (2) grant Swisher's
motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the phrase "to defile" is
inadequate to provide sufficient guidance to the jury regarding the imposi-
tion of a death sentence; 20 and (3) grant Swisher's proposed jury instruction
on voluntary intoxication.21
13. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 766.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 765.
18. Id
19. Id. at 768.
20. Id. at 771.
21. Id. at 772. Swisher raised several additional claims that will not be addressed at
length in this summary because the court's discussion centered on either wellsettled law or
facts specific to the case. The first of these claims was Swisher's argument that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to declare the death penalty scheme in Virginia unconstitutional.
Citing Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1992), the Supreme Court of Virginia
found the defendant's reference to a memorandum filed in trial court insufficient to preserve
the issue for appeal. Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 767. This is an unnecessarily technical application
of Virginia's procedural default rules since, by statute, the entire record may be designated
for appeal. VA. R. ANN. 5:10. It follows that all of Swisher's arguments were squarely before
the court. However, should the court's finding of procedural default under these circum-
stances prevail, federal review will be precluded. Given the fifty-page limit to appellate briefs,
it is likely that the defense made a tactical decision to reference the trial court record for
purposes of economy. In order to deal with the Catch-22 presented in this situation, it is
suggested that defense counsel do the following: (1) file a request for an extension of the




The Supreme Court of Virginia held (1) that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to direct the Commonwealth to file a bill of
particulars in response to Swisher's request;22 (2) that a person of "ordinary
intelligence" would conclude that the term "defile" is interchangeable with
the phrase "sexually molest," and, thus, that Swisher was adequately in-
formed of the charges against him and that the jury was capable of making
a knowing determination of guilt or innocence;23 and (3) that the trial court
properly refused Swisher's proposed jury instructions since they contained
incorrect statements of law.24
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Denial of Appellant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars
Swisher asserted that the trial court's denial of his motion for a bill of
particulars denied him the ability to effectively make pretrial challenges to
Virginia's capital murder statutory scheme.25
be raised should the request for an extension be granted.
Swisher also raised two arguments that have been settled by previous decisions these
claims were (1) whether appellant should have been granted additional peremptory chal-
lenges; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to mail a
questionnaire to the potential jury venire. Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 767.
The court also summarily dismissed Swisher's challenges to the following rulings made
by the trial court: (1) the denial of his motions to suppress his confession and all evidence
obtained from the police search of his house; (2) the denial of his motion for a change of
venue because of prejudicial media coverage of his confession; (3) the denial of Swisher's
request to ask additional questions to potential jurors during voir dire; and (4) the court's
refusal to admit testimony regarding a pillowcase containing arguably exculpatory "genetic
material" into evidence. Id. at 769-72.
22. Id. at 768.
23. Id. at 771.
24. Id. at 772.
25. Id. at 768. Portions of the motion requesting the bill of particulars were included
in the court's opinion:
[The Commonwealth is requested:]
a) To identify the grounds, and all of them, on which it contends that defendant
is tuilt of Capita Murder under... Code § 18.2-31.
b)To identify the evidence, and all of it, upon which it intends to rely in seeking
a conviction of Defendant upon the charge of Capital Murder.
c) To identify the aggravatiig factors, if any upon which it intends to rely in
seekn.g the death penalty, should defendant 6e convicted of Capital Murder.
Additionally:
1) If the Commonwealth intends to prove "vileness" as an aggravating factor.., to
identify as many of the components of the factor, including torture, depravity of
mind and aggravated battery, on which it intends to offer evidence.
2) If the Commonwealth intends to prove "vileness" as an aggravating factor.. . to
further identify every narrowing construction of that factor on wHich it intends
to offer evidence.
3) If the Commonwealth intends to prove "future dangerousness" as an aggravat-
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Specifically, Swisher contended that the bill of particulars was needed to (1)
insure that he receive constitutionally effective assistance of counsel; (2)
assist him in challenging the suppression of specific items of evidence; and
(3) assist him in challenging the constitutionality of the vileness and future
dangerousness predicates.26 The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed this
argument, noting that "[tihe purpose of a bill of particulars is to state suffi-
cient facts regarding the crime to inform an accused in advance of the offense
for which he is to be tried."27 The court went on to point out that, because
the defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter of right
when he was not challenging the sufficiency of his indictment, whether or
not to direct the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars was within the
trial court's discretion.28 Finally, the court noted that there was no constitu-
tional right to discovery.29
Swisher claimed a due process right to notice of the charges against him
and to notice of the aggravating factors the Commonwealth would rely
upon in seeking its capital murder conviction.3" The claim clearly had
merit, in spite of the Supreme Court of Virginia's refusal to address it
directly. While the indictment may contain information specific enough to
put the defendant on notice as to the charges against him, the indictment
does not set out the aggravating factors the Commonwealth intends to use
at trial.3' Further, under Virginia law, the defendant is entitled to a bill of
particulars providing this information when he is either challenging the
constitutionality of the indictment or seeking the suppression of evidence
ing factor ... to identify any unadjudicated allegations of misconduct bydefen-
dant upon which it intends to offer evidence ana circumstances of the offense it
contends are relevant to proof of the factor.
4) If the Commonwealth intends to prove "future dangerousness" as an aggravat-
i factor ... to further identify every narrowing construction of that factor on
ch it intends to offer evidence.
d) To identify the evidence, and all of it, on which it intends to rely in support
of the aggravating factors identified, and all other evidence which it intends to
introduce in support of its contention that death is the appropriate punishment
for this Defendant.
Id. at 767-68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id at 768.
27. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hevener v.
Commonwealth, 54 S.E.2d 893, 899 (Va. 1949)).
28. Id (citing Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114,122 (Va.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
887 (1996)).
29. Id. (citing Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233 (Va.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 944 (1991)).
30. Id.
31. In Virginia, juries may not consider a sentence of death until the Commonwealth
has proven one of the two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. VA. CODE ANN.
S 19.2-264.4(C)(Michie 1998). Consequently, the factors are elements of the Common-
wealth's case for death and the defendant is as much entitled to notice and opportunity to
contest them as he is to the elements of capital murder.
466 [Vol. 11:2
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on constitutional grounds. 2 The Supreme Court of Virginia ignored
Swisher's claim of entitlement to notice of the aggravating factors to be used
against him and dismissed his argument by only addressing the portions of
Swisher's request that are left to the discretion of the trial court."
Because the court did not squarely address Swisher's claim of entitle-
ment to the requested bill of particulars, defense counsel should continue to
raise objections to the denial of such a request. Furthermore, a motion for
a bill of particulars which the trial court maintains the discretion to order
should also be made. Although the trial court is not required to grant the
motion, many judges are doing so in the interest of fairness.
B. Vagueness of the Term "Defile"
The trial court denied Swisher's motion to dismiss the indictment
charging him with capital murder under section 18.2-31(1) of the Virginia
Code, 4 which alleged that the term "to defile" fails to describe sufficiently
the conduct it encompasses." The appellate court rejected this argument
and held "a person of ordinary intelligence would... conclude that the term
intent 'to defile' is interchangeable with the phrase intent to 'sexually
molest"' and, therefore, that Swisher was sufficiently informed of the
charges against hini.36
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
obliquely acknowledged that because an aggravating factor is an eligibility
term for a death sentence, the jury must make a concrete finding of its
existence before it may be used to convict the defendant of capital murder."z
A similar approach may be successful in challenging the vagueness of
32. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-266.2 (Michie 1998) ("To assist the defense in filing [a
Constitutional claim] in a timely manner, the trial court shall, upon motion of the defendant,
direct the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars pursuant to S 19.2-230 [of the Virginia
Code].") (emphasis added).
33. Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 768. The court opined, "The indictment adequately informed
Swisher of the charged offenses, and we are of opinion [sic] Swisher did not wish to use the
bill to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment, but... he desired the bill of particulars for
other reasons." Id.
34. VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31(1) (Michie 1998). The relevant part of the statute is as
follows:
The following offenses shall constitute capital murder, punishable as a Class 1felony
1. Rhe willful, deliberate, and premeditated killin of an , erson in the
commission of abduction, as defined in S 18.2-48, w en suc a duction was
committed with the intent to extort money of a pecuniary benefit or with the
intent to defile the victim of such abduction.
Id.
35. Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 771.
36. Id.
37. Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 1998).
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the term "defile." A suggested argument proceeds as follows: (1) the term
"defile" is, unquestionably, an eligibility term for capital murder under
section 18.2-31(1) of the Virginia Code; (2) as such, it requires a "yes" or
"no" determination to be made by the jury; and (3) use of the comparably
vague term "sexually molest" to define "defile," is unconstitutionally vague.
C. Voluntary Intoxication Jury Instructions
Swisher also objected to the trial court's failure to grant two of the
defense's proposed jury instructions.39 The first was to instruct the jury that
(1) a sufficient degree of voluntary intoxication could negate the requisite
intent for capital murder and (2) voluntary intoxication is not relevant to
the finding of second degree murder or manslaughter.40 The second instruc-
tion proposed by Swisher directed the jury to consider the charges and lesser
included offenses in order of seriousness.4 Strangely, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the trial court did not err in its refusal to read these
instructions because they "contained incorrect statements of the law."42
This is simply not true; both instructions were accurate.43 The question
remains, however, as to how to characterize such an error to pursue it on
federal review. Two potential attacks on a court's denial of jury instructions
that accurately depict the law in Virginia are to argue (1) that the ruling
violated the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by the
38. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (concluding that more specificity
required for death eligibility factors, compared with "selection" factors).
39. Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 772.
40. Id. The language of the proposed instruction follows:
"If you find that the defendant was so greatly intoxicated by the voluntary use
of alcohol and drugs that he was incapab-le of aeliberating or premeditating, then
you cannot find him guilty of capital murder or murder in the first degree ....
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to second degree murder or manslaugh-
ter."
Id.
41. Id. This proposed instruction read:
"You have been instructed on more than one rade of homicide and if you have
a reasonable doubt as to the grade of the offese, then you must resolve that
doubt in favor of the defendant, and find him guilty of the lesser offense.... For
example, if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he is ity of capital
murder or first degree murder, you shall find him guilty of second degree murder
or of voluntary manslaughter.... If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether
his is guilty at all, you shall find him not guilty."
Id.
42. Id.
43. See Griggs v. Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 475 (Va. 1979) (stating that evidence of
voluntary intoxication may negate the existence of premeditation and deliberation), Wright
v. Commonwealth, 363 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 1988) (same).
[Vol. 11:2
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arbitrary enforcement of a state created right+' or (2) that the ruling, and
others like it, served to create two classes of defendants charged with the
same crime-those who receive the benefit of settled Virginia law and those
who do-not-and, therefore, it violated the defendant's Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection rights.
Alix M. Karl
44. Virginia is, of course, free to attach whatever defensive significance it wishes to
voluntary intoxication. The problem here is that Swisher was plainly denied that which state
law grants to all criminal defendants.
1999]

